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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
vJ

Pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(j), this Court has appellate
jurisdiction over the final decision of the Third Judicial District Court.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
UTAH

CODE§ 10-9a-102 (See Addendum A).

UTAH

CODE§ 10-9a-601 (See Addendum A).

UTAH

CODE§ 10-9a-609 (See Addendum A).

~

UT AH CODE § 10-9a-801 (See Addendum A).
PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE§ 15- 2.11-1 (See Addendum B).
PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE§ 15-7.1-3 (See Addendum B).

vo

PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE§ 15-7.1-6 (See Addendum B).

PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE § 15-15-1.57 (See Addendum B).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants own property that is designated on the original 1974 Holiday
Ranchettes Subdivision as "'DORITY SPRINGS." (R. 15, 65, 194; see also Addendum C,
vi)

Holiday Ranchcttes Subdivision) Although their property was labeled Lot number 83. it
was designated as "'open area" with "no structures, fences or roads allowed" on the map
associated with the Declaration and Covenants, Conditions~ & Restrictions (CCRs). (R.
l 04; see also Addendum D, the Holiday Ranchettes CC&R Standards) Lot 83 was
originally reserved for a spring and pond to be used for fire protection and was excluded
from the Ranchettes' CCRs. (R. 47~ 65. 68.)
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The Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision contain 102 lots and I 08 acres and, according
to the recorded plat, it contains seven (7) lots just under one ( 1) acre including the subject
site, seventy-five (75) lots ranging from one to two (1-2) acres, seventeen (17) lots
ranging from two to three (2-3) acres, and three (3) lots over three (3) acres. (R. 69, 19294.) According to the CC&R Standards, the layout of the lots is particular including
specifically where residences, pastures, driveways and open areas must be. (Addendum
D.) Furthermore, all the lots in the Ranchettes subject to the CCRs are prohibited from
any further subdivision. (R. 30, 69.)
The springs and pond on the lot were needed for fire protection since at the time
fire hydrants did not exist in the area. (R. 47, 65.) At some point prior to 1993, fire
hydrants were installed in the area and the Fire Department therefore no longer needed
access to Dority Springs. (R. 65.) In 1993, a building permit was given to build a singlefamily home on the lot. (R. 47, 65.) In 1996, the Appellants purchased the property. (R.
30.) Now Appellants want two buildable sites on this "out of place" lot. (R. 47)
The Appellants submitted an application to Park City for plat amendment to
further divide their lot into two lots in order bui1d an additional single-family residential
structure next to Appellants' existing home. (R. 2.) The Dority Springs property is
already one of the smallest lots in the 40-year-old Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision, and
resubdividing it would create two lots that are less than half the average lot size for lots
within this established subdivision. (R. 14, 15; see also Addendum C.)
The Park City Planning Commission held two hearings on the matter and
forwarded a recommendation to the Park City Council. The Council reviewed the
2
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Appellants' application, heard evidence on the matter, weighed competing policy
concerns, and in accordance with MLUDMA found that the Appellants had not met their
burden to show "good cause" for the plat amendment and therefore denied their
application for an Ordinance for a plat amendment. The Council made certain Findings of
Fact and, based on those findings drew certain Conclusions of Law in the same format as
its Ordinances. (See R. 14-17.) Appellants appealed the Council's decision to the district
court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Park City Council acted legislatively when it denied Appellants' plat
amendment application. Following a formal legislative process, which included, inter

alia, hearing evidence on the matter, weighing broad competing policy concerns, and a
multi-tiered review, the Park City Council properly exercised its statutorily prescribed
discretion in denying Appellants' proposed plat amendment. Park City's formal
legislative process of denying or approving plat amendments is consistent with other
traditional legislative acts, and therefore, the district court was correct in ruling that Park
City at least arguably acted in its legislative capacity.
The Park City Council's denial of Appellants' plat amendment application met
both the "'reasonably debatable" and '"substantial evidence" standards. The Park City
Council exhaustively considered all aspects of Appellants' plat amendment application in
the same manner that it would for any legislative act, and ultimately determined that the
v,

interests of the broader community outweighed the proposed plat amendment ordinance.
Because Council's decision was reasonably debatable and based on substantial evidence,
3
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the decision cannot be considered arbitrary or capricious. However, the Court need only
apply the "reasonably debatable" standard to reach this conclusion-the standard applied
to legislative land-use decisions, like the one in this case. Moreover, the Council's
decision cannot be illegal because the decision comports with state and local law.
Because it is reasonably debatable that the Council's legislative denial of
Appellants' plat amendment promotes the purposes ofMLUDMA and the decision is not
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, this Court must affirm the district court's ruling.

ARGUMENT
I.

The district court did not err in finding that Park City's review of
Appellants' plat amendment application was a legislative act.

~

The City Council's review of plat amendments is legislative. An "exercise of
legislative discretion" is valid if it is "reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance,
or regulation promotes the purposes of [MLUDMA]." UTAH CODE§ 10-9a-801(3)(b).
A.

Council's consideration of an application for a subdivision ordinance is a
legislative act.

In Utah, many municipal authorities act both legislatively and administratively.
This Court found in a similar case the legislative standard applied and not the
administrative one. Olsen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 2013 UT App 262, ,r 7, n.3. In
Olsen, the Park City Council reviewed a single lot subdivision application to combine

three small parcels into a single lot of record. Id.

,r 2.

In that case, the Council approved

the subdivision application and the neighbors challenged the Council's decision. Id.
4. This Court said:

4
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,r,r 3,

While Landowners argue that we should apply other prov1s10ns of
MLUDMA dealing with 'land use application[s],' see Utah Code Ann. §
10-9a-801(2)(a), (4) (LexisNexis 2012) (emphasis added), we interpret only
subsection 801 (5), which applies to 'land use ordinance[s],' see id. § I 09a-801 ( 5) ( emphasis added), for two reasons. First, the Ordinance was
labeled 'Ordinance No. I 0-08' and entitled, 'An Ordinance Approving the
1440 Empire A venue Subdivision Located at 1440 Empire A venue, Park
City, Utah.' Second, MLUDMA defines a 'land use ordinance' as 'a
planning, zoning, development, or subdivision ordinance of the
municipality.' Id. § 10-9a-103(24) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (emphasis
added).

Id.

1 7, n.3.

Thus, this Court found in Olsen that judicial review of a decision pertaining

to a subdivision is subject to UTAH CODE Section 10-9a-801(5) (challenge to the
enactment of a land use ordinance), which is a legislative function, and not Section I 09a-80 l (2)(a), (4) (challenge to a final action on a land use decision) which is an
administrative function.
Likewise, here, if the Council approved the application being challenged, the
Council would have enacted an ordinance. PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE§ 15- 7. l-

6(C). The format of the denial with findings of fact and conclusions of law matches the
fonnat of an approved ordinance. Thus, because approving a plat amendment is a
vb

legislative act, denying it must be as well. See Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT
16, 11 3, 7, I 0-13 (holding that the denial of an application to rezone a single lot is a
legislative act). The Council function does not change based on whether the vote
approves or denies the application.

Additionally, a plat amendment ordinance is a form

of a subdivision ordinance. The plat amendment is amending the original subdivision.
8.

The district court correctly held that Park Citv's denial of Appellants· plat
amendment application \Vas legislative because the denial bore all the
hallmarks of a legislative act.

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Utah Supreme Court explained that there are two helpful guidelines in
determining whether an act is legislative: (1) "[l]egislative power gives rise to new law,
while executive power implements a law already in existence"; and (2) "[ w ]hen land use
decisions 'are at least arguably legislative,' [courts] 'give understandable deference to the
government body involved in making them and the formal nature of the ... ordinance.'"

Suarez v. Grand Cnty., 2012 UT 72, ~ 20 (citing Carter v. Lehi, 2012 UT 2, ,r~ 57, 75).
The Court further identified two "hallmarks" to help courts determine whether an act is
legislative. See Suarez, 2012 UT 72, ,r 19. First, "[l]egislative power generally ...
involves the promulgation of laws of general applicability." Id. (internal citations and
quotations omitted). Second, "[l]egislative power generally ... is based on the weighing
of broad, competing policy considerations." Id.
In Suarez, Grand County Council passed an ordinance, which approved an
amended development agreement, an amended master plan, and an amended preliminary
~

plat for a planned unit development called Cloudrock, Id. , 10 - a decision similar in
nature and effect to the plat amendment considered by the Park City Council. The

ordinance applied only to a single owner, Id. ,r 29 - like in this case.
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court examined whether the council acted
legislatively or administratively when it adopted the ordinance. See id. ,r 2. The court
held that the ordinance "create[d] new law" because (I) the ordinance replaced the
original agreement with the amended agreement; (2) "the agreement runs with the land,
and the [Planned Unit Development's] Code allows administrative deviations from the

6
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general rules imposed by the ordinance ... "~ and (3) Council weighed broad policy
considerations before passing the ordinance. Id.

il~ 22-40.

The Supreme Court noted:

[t]he ordinance was adopted after the Council had determined, among other
things, that (I) 11 the subject property is suitable for development as
proposed based on a consideration of environmental and scenic quality
impacts," (2) "the proposed uses are consistent and compatible with the
character of existing land uses in the surrounding area," (3) "any adverse
effects [of the Development] will be adequately mitigated," and (4) "the
application together with the Agreement insure that there will be adequate
public facilities and services available to serve the proposed development."
These findings illustrate that the Council weighed broad policy matters in
deciding to adopt Ordinance 454, rather than merely making a case-specific
application of existing law to the Cloudrock Application.

I.ii

Id. 1 39 (emphasis added).

Additionally, the Supreme Court reasoned, '"[ a]n act that 'extend[s] to only one or
a few individuals ... [can] still be legislative where it' both 'governs all future cases

falling under its provisions' and 'is based on general policy concerns rather than
individual circumstances."' id.~ 30 (quoting Carter, 2012 UT 2,

,r 52).

See also,

Bradley~ 2003 UT 16, 1~ 3, 7, 10-13 (holding that the Payson City Council's denial of a
single lot rezone was a legislative act) and Petersen v. Riverton City, 2010 UT 58, ,r~ 2,
11 (holding as legislative, the council's denial of an application to rezone a 20.84-acrc
lot).
Appellants' Brief omits the Suarez court's declaration that legislative acts can
apply to only one person. (See Appellants' Br. at 40-41.) Suarez specifically affirms
Carter in holding that an act can still be legislative even if it applies to only one person,
so long as two conditions exist: ( 1) the decision is based on general policy concerns and

7
vJ
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(2) the decision governs all "future cases under its provisions." See Suarez, 2012 UT 72,

,r129, 30; Carter, 2012 UT 2, 1 52.
Here, Appellants were seeking to subdivide one lot into two lots through Park
City's plat amendment process. (R. 204.) If Council had approved Appellants' proposed
amendment, it would have had to enact an ordinance. PARK CITY LAND MGMT.
CODE§ 15-7.l-6(C). The ordinance in this case would have added a brand new lot line
bisecting the existing lot, thereby creating two entirely new lots. The creation of the new
lots would have, in turn, created new boundaries, rights, privileges, and restrictions that
run appurtenant with the land and "encompass all who come within its terms." Suarez,
2012 UT 72,130. For example, Appellants would have had the right to build a singlefamily residential home on the new lot and that right would transfer with the land to all
~

successive owners as well. (R. 204.) (See Suarez, 2012 UT at ,r,r 29-34 (ordinance found
to be generally applicable because it applied not only to the current owner, but to all
future owners)).

1

In our case, there is no dispute that a plat amendment would apply

equally to the present and future owners of the two lots contemplated by the Appellants'
application and is therefore, a law of general applicability.

1

Although Suarez involved a 1900-acre parcel being developed as a planned unit
development, a much larger development than the two-lot split Appellants propose, the
Suarez court's reasoning did not rely on the scope of the project. And in fact, the Suarez
decision affirmed cases such as Petersen v. Riverton City, 2010 UT 58,- much nearer in
scope to the Appellants' one-acre lot than to the 1900-acre parcel in Suarez. This shows
that the issue in determining whether a site-specific land-use decision is a law of general
applicability is not the scope of the development that is implicated, but simply whether
the land-use decision "run[s] with the land and appl[ies] equally to the property's present
owner and all future owners." Suarez, 2012 UT 72, ,r 31.
8
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Further, like the development's code in Suarez that allowed administrative
~

deviations from the general rules of the ordinance, Park City's Land Management Code
("'LMC') provides Appellants with administrative deviations from the plat amendment
ordinance. PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE§§ 15-1-1 l(B) and (D). Specifically, if
Council had approved the ordinance, Appellants would have been able to apply for a
variance or conditional use permit, which are both administrative actions. Id.; see also

Carter, 2012 UT 2, if 71.
Moreover, Park City Council balanced broad policy concerns in determining
whether to approve or deny Appellants' plat amendment application. (R. 286.) Even
Appellants recognize that Park City's denial was policy-driven. (R. 260, 265.) Among
other considerations, Park City Council weighed environmental concerns (R. 16-17, 23,
31 ); historical land use (R. 24 and 323); fiscal impacts (R. 17); and the compatibility and
consistency of the proposed land use. Id. Council's policy considerations in this case
Xii

were similar to those contemplated in Suarez, and thus "[i]llustrate that the Council
weighed broad policy matters in deciding lwhether] to adopt [the] Ordinance ... , rather
than merely making a case-specific application of existing law to the ... Application."
Suarez~ 2011 UT 72,

if 39.

Because ( 1) the plat amendment would have created a new lot with new rights,

privileges and restrictions that encompass all successors in interest: (2) Park Citis LMC
would have provided Appellants ,vith administrative deviations from the ordinance~ and
(3) Council weighed broad policy concerns. this Court should find that the denial of

9
~
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Appellants' plat amendment application fits squarely within the definition of a legislative
act.

C.

The district court properly held that the denial was a legislative act because
the denial was "at least arguably legislative."

Recognizing that land use decisions are sometimes difficult to classify, the Utah
Supreme Court found that Courts should give deference to the local legislative bodies
when their land use decisions are "at least arguably,legislative." It stated:
[i]n cases of doubt, we give controlling significance to the form of the
underlying governmental decision. Indeed, ... when land use decisions are
at least arguably legislative, we give understandable deference to the
formal nature of the government body involved in making them and the
formal nature of the . . . ordinance. And in this case, because [the
ordinance] is at least arguably legislative, we defer to the legislative form of
the underlying decision, as evidenced by (1) the [land use authority's]

characterization of its action, (2) the substance of [the ordinance], and (3)
the formal process by which the [land use authorityJ adopted [the
ordinanceJ.
Suarez, 2012 UT 72, 1 41 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
i.

Park City's Land Management Code and the Notice ofDenial
characterize plat amendment denials as legislative acts.

Utah courts give deference to the government's characterization of its action when
determining whether an act is legisl::1tive or administrative. See, e.g., id.; Save Bec!ver

Cnty. v. Beaver Cnty., 2009 UT 8,, 20. In Save Beaver Cnty., the Utah Supreme Court
held that Beaver County was estopped from asserting that it acted administratively in
adopting an ordinance because ( 1) the ordinance stated that the county was acting
"legislatively"; (2) the recitals of the ordinance cited goals and policies, including the
promotion of "health, safety, and welfare" as a reason for adopting the ordinance; and (3)
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the county indicated that an appeal must be brought in the district court venue. 2009 UT
~

8 ,, 18-20. Similarly, in Suarez, the Supreme Court held that the council intended to act
legislatively where the ordinance stated that the council was acting "legislatively" and the

0j

county attorney indicated that an appeal may be brought only in district court. 2012 UT

72,, 44.
Likewise, here, Park City Council's denial was cloaked with the indicia of a
legislative act. First, like the ordinance in Save Beaver Cnty. that cited the promotion of
"health, safety, and welfare" in the ordinance, the Notice of Denial in this case states that
"[a]pproval of the plat amendment does adversely affect health safety. and welfare of the
citizens of Park City." (R. 17.) (emphasis added) Second, like the appeal process in Save
Beaver Cnty. and Suarez, the appeal process here was also limited to the district court

venue. Specifically, the Notice of Denial issued to Appellants cites LMC section l 5-l-

l 8(M): "The Applicant or any Person aggrieved by City action on the project may appeal
the Final Action by the City Council to a court of competent jurisdiction." (R. 17.)
Accordingly, the denial of Appellants' plat amendment was characterized as a
legislative action, and therefore~ this Court should ··defer to the legislative fonn of the
underlying decision."

ii.

Park City acted pursuant to the legislative authority granted by
MLUDMA in denying Appellants' plat amendment application.

Park City's plat amendment process has the formal nature of a legislative act
because the process involves actions that MLUDMA authorizes legislative bodies to take.
Suarez, 2012 UT 72,

~~

45~ 52 (holding that an ordinance involving "'several types of

II
~
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action that CLUDMA authorizes legislative bodies to take indicates that the Council
acted legislatively in adopting the ordinance.").
Adopting or rejecting ordinances for the subdivision of land is a legislative power
specifically delegated to municipal legislative bodies under MLUDMA. UTAH CODE§
10-9a-602. 2 Before a lot is subdivided, the legislative body is required to adopt an
ordinance. Id.; PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE§ 15-7.1-6 (C) (Review procedure for
subdivision plats). The Council is Park City's legislative body. UTAH CODE§ 10-9a103(27) ('"Legislative body' means municipal council."); see also PARK CITY MUN.
CODE § 2-2-4. Moreover, MLUDMA specifically requires that the Council enact the
subdivision by ordinance. UTAH CODE § 10-9a-602. Likewise, amending that
subdivision requires the Park City Council to adopt an ordinance. PARK CITY LAND
fut

MGMT. CODE§ 15-7.l-6(C).

iii.

Park City's plat amendment process shares the formality ofother
traditional legislative acts.

Park City employs a formal procedure in approving or denying a plat amendment
application, which Utah courts recognize as an indication of legislative action. Suarez,
2012 l JT 72; ,r SS (holding that a "formal process is an indication that the Council acted
in its legislative capacity.")

2

"The municipal legislative body may adopt or reject the ordinance either as proposed by
the planning commission or after making any revision the legislative body considers
appropriate" UTAH CODE § 10-9a-602.

~
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In the Suarez, the Supreme Court found that Grand County followed a complex
and formal procedure in approving the PUD amendments as compared to other
administrative actions. Id.
To begin with, the Planning Commission reviewed the application, held a
public hearing, and made a recommendation to the Council. After the
Planning Commission provided its recommendation, the Council scheduled
a public hearing at which it heard public comments, including objections to
the Cloudrock Application. It also received written objections from some
Citizens. After the public hearing, Cloudrock submitted its Amended
Agreement, incorporating the recommendations of the Planning
Commission. The Council did not give its approval until Cloudrock had
submitted this Amended Agreement in compliance with the Planning
Commission's recommendations. The Council then held two meetings to
consider whether to approve the Cloudrock Application. It tabled the matter
after the first meeting, and at a subsequent meeting a majority of the
Council voted to approve the Cloudrock Application and adopt Ordinance
454. This formal process is an indication that the Council acted in its
legislative capacity.

i.(f)

Id.

The plat amendment process followed by Park City is almost identical to the
formal process followed by Grand County in Suarez. Park City's LMC requires that plat
amendment applications '"be reviewed according to the requirements of Section 15-7 .16." PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE § 15-7 .1-2. First, the Park City Planning
Department schedules the application for review by the Development Review Committee
and other interested entities. Id. § 15-7. l-6(8 ). The Development Review Committee
makes recommendations for proposed action to the Planning Department Staff, who in
tum submit a report for proposed action to the Planning Commission. Id. After
providing notice, the Planning Commission ho]ds a public hearing and reviews the
application and recommendations. Id. § 15-7 .1-6( C). In this case, the Planning
13
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Commission held two hearings. (See R. 67~ 154, 156.) The Planning Commission either
makes a positive or negative recommendation to City Council. PARK CITY LAND
MGMT. CODE § 15-7. l-6(C). At a public meeting, City Council votes to either approve
or disapprove the application as submitted, or may make revisions as Council considers
appropriate prior to approval. Id. Here, Council held a meeting, heard public comments,
and voted to deny Appellants' application. (R. 231.) If Council had approved the
application, it would have needed to enact an ordinance and follow the prescribed steps
before the ordinance would become effective. PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE§
15-7.l-6(C); Olsen, 2013 UT App 262. Appeals are not handled internally, but instead
must be filed with the district court. Id. § l 5- l-18(M). This procedure is at least as
formal as the process followed by Grand County in Suarez. Id.
iv.

~1 55, 56

The discretion granted by MLUDMA in either approving or denying
plat amendments is another indication of legislative action.

MLUDMA vests land use authorities with the discretion to either approve or deny
plat amendments, as evidenced by the statute's permissive language: "[t]he land use
authority may approve the ... amendment of a plat ... if the land use authority finds that
... there is good cause for the vacation or amendment .... " UT AI I CODE § 10-9a-609( 1)
(emphasis added); see also discussion infra part III, A.
In light of the guidance provided by the Suarez court, the discretionary language
ofMLUDMA, and the case of Olsen v. Park City, 2013 UT App 262, this Court should
find that Park City Council acted legislatively in denying Appellants' plat amendment
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application. Consequently, the appropriate standard of review is the "reasonably
Li}

debatable'' standard. See infra.

II.

The denial of Appellants' plat amendment was reasonably debatable that the
decision promotes the purposes of MLUDMA and was not arbitrary or
capricious or otherwise illegal.
Utah Code states, "A decision (or) ordinance ... involving the exercise of

legislative discretion is valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision (or) ordinance
... promotes the purposes of [MLUDMA] and is not otherwise illegal." UTAH CODE§
I 0-9a-801 (3 )(b) (emphasis added). Upon review, "[ c]ourts shall ... presume that a
decision (or) ordinance ... made under the authority of [MLUDMA] is valid; [] and
determine only whether or not the decision (or) ordinance ... is arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal." Id. § 10-9a-801(3)(a). Because the denial of Appellants' plat amendment was a
legislative act, see discussion supra part I, the "reasonably debatable" standard applies.
A.

Council's denial was "reasonablv debatable" and not arbitrary or capricious

Council's land-use decision is reasonably debatable where the decision promotes
the purposes of MLUDMA. Id. Utah courts ·'will not interfere" with a "legislative
policy decision ... except in the most extreme cases.'' Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City,
2000 UT App 31, , 18. Furthermore, the burden is on the plaintiff-challenger to show
that the decision could not promote the general welfare. Id.

1, 26-28 (upholding the

city's denial of an application for rezoning despite the fact that plaintiff had mustered a
large amount of data and information in supp011 of the application, and noting that ··a city

may rely on the concerns of interested citizens ,,,hen performing legislative functions").
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In this case, Appellants' have failed to show that the decision could not promote the
general welfare.
The enumerated purposes of MLUDMA are manifold:
[T]o provide for the health, safety, and welfare, and promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort,
convenience, and aesthetics of each municipality and its present and future
inhabitants and businesses, to protect the tax base, to secure economy in
governmental expenditures, to foster the state's agricultural and other
industries, to protect both urban and nonurban development, to protect and
ensure access to sunlight for solar energy devices, to provide fundamental
fairness in land use regulation, and to protect property values.
UTAH CODE§ 10-9a-102(1) (emphasis added). If the Court finds that it is reasonably
debatable that Council's decision promotes any of these purposes, the decision cannot be
deemed arbitrary or capricious.
Additionally, Utah courts recognize that city councils have wide knowledge of the
circumstances and conditions surrounding the land use in question, and as such, "[i]t is
their duty and obligation to take into consideration their own knowledge of such matters
and also to gather available pertinent information from all possible sources and give
consideration to it in making their determination." Gay/and v. Salt Lake Cnty., 358 P.2d
633,636 (Utah 1961); see also Harmon City, 2000 UT App 3 I,

,r 27; Smith Inv.

Co. v.

Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 253 n. 12 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Here, Park City Council considered information regarding the historical intent of
the subdivision (R. 15 ,J 24, 65, 104, I 09), the nature of the Holiday Ranchettes
Subdivision with its open space and grazing areas (R. 104), the location of the property
with regard to other subdivisions (R. 154), the City's General Plan (R. 24, 56, 67, 95),
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environmental concerns (R. 16-17, 23~ 31), fiscal impacts (R. 17), and compatibility (R.
54.) Council received input from concerned citizens, both written and oral (R. 40-44,
105-110), as well as from the Planning Commission's recommendation. For further
discussion of the evidence supporting the Council's decision, see infra part Il.8.
This information, as well as the Council members' own knowledge about the area
as residents and public officials of Park City, provided Council with a comprehensive
basis for determining that the "welfare," "prosperity," "good order," "aesthetics," and
·'property values" of Park City and principles of fundamental fairness were best served by
denying the plat amendment. Therefore, a reasonable person could easily conclude that
Council's decision promotes the purposes of MLUDMA.
The Council's concerns regarding the fit of Lot 83 if further subdivided and
citizens' concerns about the impact that increasing density would have on their
neighborhood provide additional basis for the Council and Commission to determine that
the purposes of MLUDMA would be best served by denying the plat amendment.
While Appellants provided other information in support of their application information on which a reasonable person may have been able to arrive at an opposite
conclusion than the Council - the Court cannot substitute its judgment for the Council's.

See Bradley v. Payson Corp., 2003 UT 16,124 (upholding the city's legislative land-use
decision that was based on its general plan and comments from its citizens - even in the
face of expert testimony hired by the plaintiff). The decision can only be set aside if
there is no reasonable basis for it. See id. Because the above and other infonnation in
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the Record supports a reasonably debatable conclusion that denying the plat amendment
promoted the purposes ofMLUDMA, the Court must uphold Council's decision.
B.

The district court did not err in finding Council's decision supported by
"substantial evidence" in the Record.

In the alternative, even if the Council's denial of the plat amendment is deemed to
be an "administrative" land-use decision, it is supported by substantial evidence and
therefore must be upheld. A decision is supported by substantial evidence if "a
reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion." Carlsen v. Bd. ofAdjustment, 2012
UT App 260, ,r 5.

The decision need not be the only reasonable conclusion from the

evidence; it merely needs to be supported by the evidence. Patterson v. Utah Cnty. Bd. of

Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Appellants specifically argue that the Council's Conclusions of Law are not
supported by substantial evidence in the Record. (Appellants' Br. at 42.) However, in so
arguing, Appellants ignore the Findings of Fact and significant portions of the Record.
The Park City Council received and considered a large amount of evidence in deciding
whether to approve or deny the plat amendment. Much of that evidence reasonably
supports the conclusions that ,.vere the basis of the denial of the plat amendment.
Furthermore, as noted by the District Court, even if the reviewing court disagrees with a
conclusion made by the Council, if the reviewing court finds even one conclusion correct,
that is enough to uphold the Council's denial of the plat amendment.
i.

There is substantial evidence supporting the Conclusion that the
proposed amendment is not consistent with State and City law. (R. 122,
at ,r 1.)
a. Good Cause
18
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State law requires that an applicant show "good cause" for a proposed plat
amendment. UTAH CODE § 10-9a-609( 1). City law provides a definition of ~'good cause"
that applicants must meet:
Providing positive benefits and mitigating negative impacts, determined on
a case by case basis to include such things as: providing public amenities
and benefits, resolving existing issues and non-conformities, addressing
issues related to density, promoting excellent and sustainable design,
utilizing best planning and design practices, preserving the character of the
neighborhood and of Park City and furthering the health, safety, and
welfare of the Park City community.
PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE

§ 15-15-1.114. Even if the definition of "good cause" in

~

City law is ignored, the common understanding of the term points to the discretion of the
decision-maker who is asked to find good cause. See Black's Law Dictionary 692 (6th ed.
VJJ

1990) (noting that a finding of good cause "lies largely in discretion of officer or court to
which decision is committed.... It is a relative and highly abstract tenn .... ").

~

There is substantial evidence in the Record that supports the Council's
determination that there was not good cause for the plat amendment: ( 1) the evidence
regarding lot size and lot depth; (2) the evidence regarding the nature of other properties
in the Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision and that the other lots in the Subdivision cannot be
subdivided; (3) the evidence regarding the history of the lot, subdivision, and HOA; and
(4) public input regarding the amendment and increases in density - not to mention the
Council's own expertise in this area. If the Council does not find good cause for the
proposed amendment, it must follow that the proposed amendment is not consistent with
State and City law.
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The Council examined an objective analysis of the two lots that the amendment
proposed to create, in relation to the surrounding properties - including four properties

Gv

across the street in the Park Meadows No. 5 Subdivision. (R. 98-103, 112-13.) City staff
prepared the analysis, and the Appellants had the opportunity to address with their own
testimony and evidence any shortcomings of that analysis. Two factors of the analysis lot size and lot depth - showed that the proposed amendment would alter the "character
of the neighborhood" and be detrimental to the public's interest.
The Council also looked at evidence regarding the nature of other properties in the
Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision, of which Lot 83 is a part. No other lots in the
Subdivision under the CCRs can be subdivided and all are close to or greater than one
acre. Because of its legacy of being the spring lot, it is exempt from the restrictions of
the HOA Declarations. Lot 83 was still platted as part of a unique subdivision that
provides a certain type of setting and lifestyle to its owners. The open space and ranchstyle living convey a benefit to properties in the subdivision that would be lost if their
neighbors were split up into smaller lots. While the Appellants argue that the Council's
decision is arbitrary because its definition of "neighborhood" is too restrictive, what they

~

really want is to make two lots in the Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision look just like lots
in the Park Meadows No. 5 Subdivision. A driving purpose for the Council's decision
must be to measure the proposal's compatibility with surrounding properties particularly
those within the Ranchettes subdivision itself. PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE § 152.11-1 (B); see also Suarez, 2012 UT 72, ,I 39 (acknowledging that the council's
determination of whether "the proposed uses are consistent and compatible with the
20
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character of existing land uses in the surrounding area" was a policy-driven consideration
in a land-use decision). Therefore, the nature and setting of the Holiday Ranchettes
Subdivision provide further evidence supporting the Council's determination that there
was not good cause for the plat amendment.
The Council considered the history of the lot, subdivision, and HOA. Lot 83 was
labeled as "Dority Springs" on the initial subdivision; it was used at the time solely for
pumping water for the Fire Department; and the HOA plat shows it as open space. (R.
15, at, 24, 65, I 09.) Therefore, it was reasonable for the City Council to conclude that
the property was exempt from the HOA Declarations not because it was intended to be
developed differently, but rather because it was not intended to be developed at all. (R.
4 7.) After the use and character of the property changed with the disappearance of the
pond, the City allowed a residence to be built on the property. (R. 65-66.) Splitting the
lot in two where all other like situated property is prohibited from such subdivision would
make it even more anomalous than its untypical shape already makes it by entirely taking
away its ranch-style fit with the other properties in the Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision.
The Council also considered the General Plan and public input regarding (a) the
proposed amendment specifically, and (b) increased density generally. The City's
residents have expressed an aversion to increasing density in existing neighborhoods via
infill, with the exception of one neighborhood - Bonanza Park. Charged with weighing
and evaluating such policy concerns. the Council properly considered such evidence as
relevant with regard to the application for plat amendment. Accordingly, the dictates and
policy statements of the General Plan and the input of the City's residents arc additional
21
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence in support of the Council's determination that Appellants did not show good
cause for the proposed plat amendment.

b. Compatibility
The Land Management Code defines compatibility as: "Characteristics of
different Uses or designs that integrate with and relate to one another to maintain and/or
enhance the context of a surrounding Area or neighborhood .... " PARK CITY LAND
MGMT. CODE§ 15-15-1.57. The definition goes on to list some elements that commonly
affect compatibility, such as scale, parking, and topography, but explicitly notes that
other elements may apply. Id.
There is substantial evidence in the record supporting the Council's determination
that the plat amendment was not compatible with existing developments: ( 1) the evidence
regarding lot size and lot depth; (2) the evidence regarding the nature and character of the
Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision; (3) the public input and evidence as to the General Plan;
(4) the evidence regarding subdivision boundaries; and (5) the Planning Commission and
City Council members' own observations of the property.
The Council considered City staffs analysis of the proposed lots as they would
relate to surrounding properties. The analysis looked at five different objective factors.
With regard to two of those factors - lot size and lot depth - the lots under the proposed
plat amendment were extremely inconsistent. Appellants argue that because the proposed
lots were arguably compatible with regard to three of the five factors, then the plat
amendment must be compatible. (See Appellants' Br. at 46.) However, to say that
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something is compatible in some ways and incompatible in other ways is to say that it is,
as a whole, incompatible.
The Council also considered evidence given as public input as to the proposed
amendment's compatibility - both by written communication and in person at the
hearings. Two neighbors spoke in favor of the Appellants' application, while several
others spoke against, citing factors such as density, open space, and their expectations
regarding development in the neighborhood.
Appellants argued throughout the process that its plat amendment would be
compatible because the property is at the edge of the Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision,
and therefore the property should be allowed to look more like the nearby Park Meadows
No. 5 and Racquet Club areas. However, from a broad perspective, this argument would
~

strip away the City Council's zoning powers and vitiate the diversity that areas like Park
Meadows feature. A majority of the lots in Holiday Ranchettes are located on the edge of
the subdivision. (See R. 24-26.) To argue that the property's proximity to other
subdivisions means that it should be allowed to look like those other subdivisions would
eventually do away with the distinctiveness of all subdivisions. Accordingly, this
evidence regarding the subdivision boundaries supports the Council's policy-driven
determination that the proposed plat amendment is not compatible with existing
developments.
Appellants argue that compatibility is irrelevant to determining whether good
cause exists. (Appellants' Br. at 43-44.) Their argument is entirely based on an
assumption that if the proposed amendment does not exceed the density restrictions or
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vary from the allowed uses of the Single Family (SF) zoning classification, then it
necessarily comports with the stated purposes of the zoning classification. Id. However,
Appellants submit no legal support for that conclusion.
Appellants' argument ignores the scope of authority MLUDMA vests in
municipalities: "To accomplish the purposes of this chapter, municipalities may enact
ordinances, resolutions, and rules ... that they consider necessary or appropriate for the
use and development of land within the municipality ... governing ... considerations of
surrounding land uses .... " UTAH CODE § 10-9a-l 02(2). In light of this language, the
Court should find that compatibility is a relevant factor in determining whether "good
cause" exists. If merely meeting the minimum zoning requirements required approval,
then what is the function of a Planning Commission and City Council in such matters but
as a rubber stamp.
The purpose statement of the SF zone includes a need for development that is
"compatible with existing developments." PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE § 15-2.111(B). Accordingly, evidence as to the proposed amendment's compatibility, as that term
is defined in City ordinances, is relevant to the Council's decision.
Appellants further argue that the Council's analysis of compatibility did not
compare the application to existing developments. (Appellants' Br. at 44-45.)
Appellants' definition of "existing developments" is a broad reference of comparison
which does not include any "direct neighborhood." Id. Appellants' definition strips the
City Council of the ability to define the boundaries of the compatibility analysis. Such an
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expansive definition would require the Council to consider every development in the City
when determining compatibility.
However, the compatibility analysis must necessarily have some outer boundary.
The Council made a reasonable determination based on evidence of which existing
developments should be evaluated for purposes of compatibility. The P1anning
Commission discussed at some length different options for drawing boundaries on the
analysis, and reasonably concluded that it should be limited to single-family properties
along the same street. The analysis done by City staff included properties across the street
in a neighboring development, Park Meadows No. 5; it was not limited, as Appellants
aver, to the same side of the street. (R. 98-103~ 112-13.) The MARC, golf course, and
Racquet Club Condos - also located across the street - are different zones, which, as all
the members of the Planning Commission agreed, makes them visibly distinct from the
two adjacent subdivisions that are zoned for SF development. Thus it was not arbitrary
and capricious for the Council to determine compatibility under LMC sections 15-2.11-1
and 15-15-1.57 with the 13 single-family properties along Little Kate Road.

There is substantial evidence supporting the Conclusion that the
proposed amendment would materially injure the public. (R. 122, at
,12.)
Appellants argue that the Record does not contain any evidence regarding material
ii.

injury to the public. (Appellants' Br. at 46.) However, the above and other facts in the
Record show that the property would not be compatible with the existing developments,
and that therefore the character of the neighborhood would change if the plat amendment
were approved. As the Record shows, many property owners purchased in reliance on a
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relative stasis in density and character of the nearby properties. Increases in density and
loss of diversity affect not only those properties in close proximity, but the community as
a whole, as City resources are affected and the unique diversity of the Park Meadows area
and Park City as a whole are denigrated.

iii. There is substantial evidence in support of the Conclusion that the plat
amendment adversely affects the health, safety, and welfare of the
citizens ofPark City. (R. 123, at ,r 3.)
Under ML UDMA, municipalities are authorized to make land-use decisions in
order to "provide for the health, safety, and welfare" of their residents. See, e.g., UTAH
CODE § 10-9a-102( 1). This consideration underlies every land-use decision, and courts
interpret the requirement broadly, granting exceeding deference to municipal land-use
decisions. Patterson, 893 P.2d 602, 606-607.
Appellants contend that it is not possible that "one additional single family home
in this 'neighborhood', however it is defined, that is fully compliant with the zoning of
the Property could adversely affect the health, safety or welfare of the citizens of Park
City." (Appellants' Br. at 49.) Appellants fail to acknowledge that zoning regulations
seek to preserve land values - not for particular individuals, but rather, for the community
as a whole. 1 Yokley, ZONING LAW & PRACTICE § 2-2. Thus, the Council did not only
have to consider the windfall the Appellants would get by being able to further subdivide
the Dority Springs, but it could consider the impacts and the expectations of the
community. They do so by seeking to ensure a well-balanced community with orderly
development, rational coordination between the different actors, and the stability of
property uses. Id. The ties between the broader objective of public health, safety, and
26
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welfare, and the more-specific objectives of orderly development and stability of use are
plenary and undisputed. 3 Thus, if a site-specific land-use decision tends to promote
orderly development, it follows that it also tends to promote the general welfare. See id.
Not only is orderly development a well-established component of the general
health, safety, and welfare, but so too are aesthetic and neighborhood-character concerns.
See 4-56 ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 56.05 (2d ed., 1997) and cases cited
therein (stating that aesthetic concerns are a substantial government interest "entitled to
weighty respect," and noting precedent for the idea that aesthetic considerations alone are
enough to make land-use decisions "reasonable and valid"); 12-79C POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY

§ 79C.03(2)( c) (fitting preservation of neighborhood characteristics within the

concept of "general welfare," and acknowledging that purely aesthetic motivations can
sustain land-use decisions). Utah courts have also recognized that aesthetic concerns and
recreational needs are a few of the many legitimate ends served by municipal land-use
decisions. Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 410 P.2d 764, 765 (Utah 1966); see also
Patterson, 893 P .2d 602, 607. Further, MLUDMA expressly declares "aesthetics of each
3

(;J

See, e.g.. Patterson, 893 P.2d 602, 607 ('~Accordingly, we conclude that a proposed
special exception will 'promote the health, safety and welfare' if to grant the exception
will make good zoning policy, meaning it 1,vill contribute to the orderly development of
the county as a whole.'·) (emphasis added); Viii. of Chatham v. Cnty. of Sangamon, 216
Ill. 2d 402, 428 (Ill. 2005) ("'The orderly development of municipalities is a matter clearly
impacting upon the public health, safety, and welfare.~'); Shahan v. Franklin Cnty.~ 2003
Tenn. App. LEXIS 929, * 17. 2003 WL 23093836 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that
municipal planning ordinances -~exist to promote the health, safety. and welfare of the
local residents and property owners by prescribing unifonn rules for the orderly
development of real property'"); Coleman v. To11-'n of Forest Lake. 1994 Minn. App.
LEXIS 628. 1994 WL 323383 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding city prohibition of resubdivision of platted lots based on the stated purpose of "insur[ing] the orderly
development of land'"').
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municipality" as one of its purposes. UTAH CODE§ 10-9a-102(1).

The subdivision in

which Lot 83 is located contains I 02 lots that have a very distinct look - including areas

WI

on each lot designated for barns, grazing areas, and open space. The proposed lot
amendment would create two lots with none of the features that the other properties in the
subdivision share
Here, there was substantial evidence that re-subdividing Appellants' lot would not
promote the health, safety, and welfare of Park City as a whole. First, the Council
reviewed extensive data which supported that the proposed lots were physically
incongruous with surrounding development - thereby having the effect of disordering

~

development in the area. Second, the Council discussed at some length the history of the
lot as open space, and how the development at issue did not contemplate any structure on
~

Appellants' lot, much less two in such close proximity. To approve the plat amendment
proposed by Appellants would upset the expectations of all who developed nearby in
reliance on the approved, recorded subdivision plat that labeled the incongruous lot
"Dority Springs" and the recorded Covenants that show the lot as an open-space lot. Any
concept of "orderly development" must include some notion of reasonable, settled
expectations. It's one thing for a developer who has not yet sold individual lots to redraw
the lines; it's entirely another for an individual lot owner 40 years later, long after homes
and other developments had filled in around them, to disorder the long-settled pattern of
development in the area.
Third, the Council considered evidence regarding the Holiday Ranchettes

~

Subdivision and associated HOA covenants, which also demonstrated the expectations of
28
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GJ

those involved including minimum lot size and setbacks - from City planner to
~

developers to subsequent purchasers. Appellants claiming a right to split their lot in two
vitiates all of the planning that went into the development. The Council acted
appropriately in considering evidence regarding those planning efforts. and it was
reasonable for the Council to conclude therefrom that the Appellants' application would
cause injury to the community and adversely affect the health, safety, and welfare of Park
City by disrupting those careful, long-range development plans-i.e .. orderly
development of Park City.
Fourth, the Planning Commission and some members of the City Council
personally visited Appellants' property in order to assess for themselves the proposed
development's physical and aesthetic incongruity and disruptive effect on the orderly

vi)

development of both the Park Meadows community and the City as a whole. The City
Council is the body uniquely qualified to measure the decision ·s broader impact on the
community. Appellants would strip the Council of that obligation and arrogate to
themselves and their advisors the right to determine whether their application contributed
to the orderly development of the City.
Fifth, the Council considered the General Plan and its long-range planning
objectives. further contributing to the body of evidence in support of the Council ·s
determination that the Appellants' application did not support the orderly development of
Park City - therefore adversely affecting the health. safety, and welfare of the City.
Sixth~ the evidence regarding the character of the Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision,
which provides a recreational opportunity of ranch-style living that is not otherwise
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available in such close proximity to a developed community like Park City, likewise
ijp

supports the Council's determination.
While Appellants claim that it is "simply impossible" that their application for plat
amendment "could cause any material harm to anyone or anything, (Appellants' Br. at
49), the Record shows that the Appellants' plat amendment would ( 1) double the
development on a lot that was never intended for development, (2) remove open space,
(3) increase density, (4) create two incongruous lots in a 40-year-old subdivision, (5)
frustrate the settled expectations of a well-developed community, and (6) diminish the
recreational ranch-style living of the subdivision. It is self-evident that these
consequences cause material injury to the public and adversely affect the general health,
safety, and welfare of Park City.

iv. There is substantial evidence in support ofthe Conclusion that the
Plaintiffs did not show good cause for the proposed plat amendment. (R.
123, at ,I 4.)
As noted above, State law requires that applicants for a plat amendment show
good cause for the amendment. UTAH CODE § 10-9a-609( I). There is substantial
evidence in the Record that supports the Council's determination that Plaintiffs did not
show good cause for the plat amendment: ( 1) the evidence regarding lot size and lot
depth; (2) the evidence regarding the nature of other properties in the Holiday Ranchettes
Subdivision; (3) the evidence regarding the history of the lot, subdivision, and HOA; and
(4) public input regarding the amendment and increases in density - not to mention the
Council's own expertise in this area. Each is discussed in the subsections above.
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Though Appellants may have come up with some good reasons for approval in
lJP

support of their application, such as their own monetary benefit, (R. 11, at, 35 "Here.
the good cause for the Trustees is that the New Lot will, indisputably, be worth several
hundreds of thousands of dollars."), the City Council is tasked with weighing the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the proposed amendment to settled law. To approve a
plat amendment, the Council must find good cause - as, in this case, some 40 years have
passed since the area was subdivided and developed, and expectations of property owners
in the area have justifiably settled. In deciding whether good cause is present, the Council
weighs the policy concerns inherent in such a decision, and as a rule, the courts give
enormous deference to such legislative balancing.
Appellants have failed to show any manifest unfairness, injustice, or bad faith in
the Council's decision. See Patterson, 893 P.2d 602, 604. The permissive language of
the statute gives the Council discretion to weigh policy concerns in deciding whether to

~

grant a plat amendment.
Although the lot is exempt from the HOA Declarations, it is still a part of the
Holiday Ranchettes Subdivision. The Appellants bought the property well after the
subdivision had been developed and expectations settled. Resubdividing the lot would
only unsettle those expectations, which is likely the reason why the legislature used
compulsory language for new subdivisions, while providing land use authorities with
broad discretion in approving or denying subdivision plat amendments. See UTAH CODE
§§ 10-9a-603(2)(a) and 609( 1); see also discussion infra part III. The Appellants own
one buildable lot, just as all of their neighbors do. This is not the "'extreme case" that
31
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would merit judicial interference. See Bradley, 2003 UT 16, 1 24 (citing Harmon City,
2000 UT App. 31, 1 18). Rather, it is simply a case of a landowner who is dissatisfied
with the City Council's reasonable exercise of the discretion afforded by state law.
Because the Council's decision to deny the Appellants' application for plat
amendment was reasonably debatable and supported by substantial evidence, this Court
should uphold the Council's decision.

III.

The denial of Appellants' plat amendment application was not illegal.
A municipal land-use decision is not illegal unless it violates a law, statute, or

ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made. UTAH CODE§ I 0-9a-801(3)(d).
Because the Council's decision comports with state and municipal code, it is not illegal.
A.

Council's decision comports with state law.

Appellants contend that under Section 10-9a-609 there is a "presumption of
approval" and that the statute has a "directive that a plat amendment shall be granted
when Good Cause exists." (Appellant's Br. at 57.) However, Appellants misstate the
law, as the statute imposes no affirmative mandate on the Council to approve a plat
amendment, even where an applicant establishes that there is "good cause." UTAH CODE

§ 10-9a-609( I). Appellants' assertion ignores the text of the statute, which states that the
municipal land-use authority "may" approve a plat amendment. Id. (emphasis added).
This permissive modal is in contrast with compulsory modals used in other parts of
MLUDMA. For example, owners of adjacent parcels are allowed to exchange title to
portions of those parcels; as long as the exchange does not violate existing land-use

(0,i

ordinances, the land-use authority "shall" approve the exchange. Id. § 10-9a-608(5).
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Gy

The same compulsory modal is used with reference to subdivision plats. If a
subdivision plat conforms to state and city laws, the municipality "shall" approve it. Id. §
I 0-9a-603(2)(a). In this case, Appellants are not seeking to create a '~subdivision" under
section 10-9a-603, as Appellants' lot is already part of the Holiday Ranchettes
Subdivision. (R. 1, 2.) To the contrary, Appellants are seeking to amend the platted
subdivision, which is governed under section 10-9a-609. (R. 2.) Therefore, the
permissive "may" of the provision regarding plat amendments gives the Council
discretion to deny an amendment application- even if the applicants fulfill their
obligation to show good cause. See Williams v. Public Serv. Comm 'n. 754 P.2d 41, 48
(Utah 1998) (holding that "specific [statutory] provisions ... prevail over the more
general provision''). Because "shall" and "may" are diametric opposites and the relevant
statute (Section 10-9a-609) contains the permissive '"may" modal, this Court should
jettison Appellants' assertion that there is a presumption of approval for plat
amendments. Furthermore, the cases cited by Appellants supporting the "presumption of
approval" apply to platting a new subdivision under section 10-9a-603, and therefore are
of no import to the facts of this case. 4 Again, plat amendments are governed under the
more specific statute-section I 0-9a-609. 5

vi

4

The case that Appellants cite for the proposition that the City is required to appron~
their application. Western Land Equities 1·. City a/Logan. 617 P.2d 3 8R. 396 (Ctah 1980).
merely states the same thing as the statute and is inapposite to this case~ it addressed a
new subdivision, not an application for plat amendment of an existing subdivision.
5
This compulsory language in section 10-9a-603 and the permissive language in section
10-9a-609 makes sense when one considers the impact of subdividing. O,:vncrs of lots in
subdivisions such as Holiday Ranchettes expect that absent any extraordinary
circumstances. the look and feel or a subdivision - the sizing. spacing. density~ etc. - ,vii I
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B.

Council's decision comports with local law.

The Park City's LMC defines good cause as:
Providing positive benefits and mitigating negative impacts, determined on
a case by case basis to include such things as: providing public amenities
and benefits, resolving existing issues and non-conformities, addressing
issues related to density, promoting excellent and sustainable design,
utilizing best planning and design practices, preserving the character of the
neighborhood and of Park City and furthering the health, safety, and
welfare of the Park City community.
PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE§ 15-15-1.114. This definition gives applicants a
standard to evaluate whether their application shows good cause. The juxtaposition of
the City's definition with MLUDMA's stated purposes shows that the definition
comports with the spirit of State law. See supra part II.B., for further discussion of the
reasonableness of the Council's decision finding the application lacked good cause.
~

Therefore, because the decision complies with State and City code, it is not illegal.

CONCLUSION

Appellants' have failed to overcome the statutory presumption of validity under
the standards in section 10-9a-801(3). Moreover, the district court did not err in finding
that the Park City Council's decision was a valid legislative act. The district court
correctly applied the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Suarez to reach the conclusion
that the Council's decision was an exercise of "legislative discretion" because ( 1) the
stay the same as time passes. Local circumstances might mitigate or override that
reasonable reliance on settled expectations, and the City Council is the correct body for
making such a policy-dependent determination. Thus, the State law provides the Council
legislative discretion when it comes to plat amendments that upset subdivisions, even
though it does not afford that same discretion for initial subdivisions of undeveloped
land.
34
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decision followed a formal legislative process, (2) the decision was characterized by Park
City as legislative, and (3) the decision itself was substantively a legislative matter. The
process included hearing evidence on the matter, weighing broad competing policy
concerns, and a multi-tiered review. The Council exhaustively considered all aspects of
Appellants' plat amendment application in the same manner it would for any legislative
act, and ultimately determined that the interests of the broader community outweighed
the proposed plat amendment ordinance. If Council had approved Appellants' proposed
amendment, it would have had to enact an ordinance pursuant to PARK CITY LAND
MGMT. CODE§ 15-7. 1-6(C), which would have governed all future decisions falling
under its provisions. Since enacting an ordinance is clearly a legislative matter, making a
decision to not enact one would be legislative as well. Further, the decision is at least
arguably an exercise of legislative discretion. The Utah Supreme Court will give

deference to land use decisions that are at least arguably legislative.
Because the Council acted in its legislative capacity, this Court must apply the
"reasonably debatable" standard in reviewing this land-use decision. In the case at bar, it
is reasonably debatable that the decision promoted the purposes ofMLUDMA. The
Council weighed the negative impacts of approving Appellants' plat amendment
application against the positive impacts. From a community-centered perspective,
approving the plat amendment would not promote the purposes of MLUDMA: the plat
amendment would (I) double the development on a lot that was never intended for
development in the first place; (2) remove open space; (3) increase density; (4) create two
incongruous lots in an existing subdivision; frustrate the settled expectations of a 40-year35
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old subdivision; and (5) diminish the recreational ranch-style living of the subdivision.
All these factors affect the welfare of the community, its prosperity, peace and good
order, and aesthetics. The Council is charged with protecting the tax base, providing
fundamental fairness in land use regulation, and protecting property values.
Even if this court were to find that the decision was not even arguably legislative,
the decision was nevertheless supported by substantial evidence in the record and was not
arbitrary, capricious or illegal. The Council considered information regarding the
historical intent and nature of the subdivision, the location of the property with regard to
other subdivisions, the City's General Plan, environmental concerns, fiscal impacts,
compatibility, as well as the Council members' own knowledge about the area as
residents and public officials of Park City. The decision was not illegal because it did not
~

violate any laws, statutes, or ordinances.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant-Appellee Park City Municipal Corporation
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District Court's decision.

ADDENDA
Determinative statutory provisions, local ordinances, and relevant portions of the
record are atta~hed pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6) and
(a)(l l)(C).

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure 24(f)(l). This brief contains 10,539 excluding the parts of the brief exempted

by Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(f)(l )(B).
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ADDENDUM A
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS FROM THE UTAH CODE:

UTAH CODE§ 10-9a-102. Purposes -- General land use authority.
~

( 1) The purposes of this chapter are to provide for the health, safety, and welfare, and
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, convenience,
and aesthetics of each municipality and its present and future inhabitants and businesses,
to protect the tax base, to secure economy in governmental expenditures, to foster the
state's agricultural and other industries, to protect both urban and nonurban development,
to protect and ensure access to sunlight for solar energy devices, to provide fundamental
fairness in land use regulation, and to protect property values.
(2) To accomplish the purposes of this chapter, municipalities may enact all ordinances,
resolutions, and rules and may enter into other forms of land use controls and
development agreements that they consider necessary or appropriate for the use and
development of land within the municipality, including ordinances, resolutions, rules,
restrictive covenants, easements, and development agreements governing uses, density,
open spaces, structures, buildings, energy efficiency, light and air, air quality,
transportation and public or alternative transportation, infrastructure, street and building
orientation and width requirements, public facilities, fundamental fairness in land use
regulation, considerations of surrounding land uses and the balance of the foregoing
purposes with a landowner's private property interests, height and location of vegetation,
trees, and landscaping, unless expressly prohibited by law.
UTAH CODE§

10-9a-601. Enactment of subdivision ordinance.

( 1) The legislative body of a municipality may enact ordinances requiring that a
subdivision plat comply with the provisions of the ordinance and this part before:
(a) it may be filed or recorded in the county recorder's office; and
(b) lots may be sold.

(2) If the legislative body fails to enact a subdivision ordinance, the municipality may
regulate subdivisions only to the extent provided in this part.
10-9a-609. Land use authority approval of vacation or amendment of plat
-- Recording the amended plat.
UTAH CODE§

( 1) The land use authority may approve the vacation or amendment of a plat by signing
an amended plat shm:ving the vacation or amendment if the land use authority finds that:
39
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(a) there is good cause for the vacation or amendment; and
(b) no public street, right-of-way, or easement has been vacated or amended.

***
UTAH CODE§ 10-9a-801. No district court review until administrative remedies

exhausted -- Time for filing -- Tolling of time -- Standards governing court review -Record on review -- Staying of decision.

***
(3) (a) The courts shall:
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of
this chapter is valid; and
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion
is valid if it is reasonably debatable that the decision, ordinance, or regulation promotes
the purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal.
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, ordinance,
or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was
made or the ordinance or regulation adopted.

***
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to the
reviewing court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders, and,
if available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings.

***
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the
land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence
40
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~

was offered to the land use authority or appeal authority, respectively, and the
court determines that it was improperly excluded.

***
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ADDENDUMB
DETERMINATIVE ORDINANCES FROM THE PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE:
PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE§ 15- 2.11-1. PURPOSE.

The purpose of the Single Family SF District is to:
(A) maintain existing predominately Single Family detached residential
neighborhoods,
(B)

allow for Single Family Development Compatible with existing Developments,

(C)
maintain the character of mountain resort neighborhoods with Compatible
residential design; and
(D) require Streetscape design that minimizes impacts on existing residents and
reduces architectural impacts of the automobile.
PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE § 15-7.1-3. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBDIVISION.

***
(B) PLAT AMENDMENT. The combining of existing subdivided Lots into one or more
Lots or the amendment of plat notes or other platted elements including but not limited to
easements, limits of disturbance boundaries or areas, building pads, and house size
limitations. Plat Amendments shall be reviewed according to the requirements of Section
15-7 .1-6 Final Subdivision Plat and approval shall require a finding of Good Cause.
PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE § 15-7.1-6. FINAL SUBDIVISION PLAT.

(A) APPLICATION PROCEDURE AND REQUIREMENTS. Following approval of the
Preliminary Plat, if necessary, the Applicant, if he wishes to proceed with the
Subdivision, shall file with the Planning Department an Application for approval of a
final Subdivision Plat. The Application shall:
( 1) Be made on forms available at the Planning Department and determined complete.
A complete Application shall include all elements of the Subdivision and shall
produce all information required by the Subdivision Application.
(2) Include all contiguous holdings of the Owner, unless specifically waived by the
Planning Department and Planning Commission, including land in the "same
ownership," as defined herein, with an indication of the portion which is proposed to
42
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be subdivided, accompanied by an affidavit of ownership, which shall include the
dates the respective holdings of land were acquired, together with the book and page
of each conveyance to the present Owner as recorded in the County Recorder's office.
The affidavit shall advise as to the legal Owner of the Property, the contract Owner of
the Property, the date a contract of sale was executed, and, if any corporations are
involved, a copy of the resolution legally empowering the Applicant to make the
Application.
(3) Include the entire Subdivision, or section thereof, which derives access from an
existing state, county or local government highway.

(B) REVIEW OF FINAL SUBDIVISION PLAT. The Planning Department staff shall
schedule the Final Plat Application for review by the Development Review Committee,
including officials or agencies of the local government, adjoining counties or
municipalities, school and special districts, and other official bodies as it deems necessary
or as mandated by law, including any review required by metropolitan, regional, or state
bodies under applicable state or federal law.
The Planning Department shall request that all officials and agencies, to whom a request
for review has been made, submit their report to the Staff. The Staff will consider all the
reports submitted by the officials and agencies concerning the Final Subdivision Plat and
shall submit a report for proposed action to the Planning Commission.
Once an Application is received, the Staff will work diligently to review the Application,
as quickly as time and workload allows. The scale or complexity of a project or Staff
workload may necessitate a longer processing period. In such cases the Staff will notify
the Applicant when an Application is filed as to the projected time frame.
(C) PLANNING COMMISSION ANTI CITY COUNCIL REVIEW OF FINAL
SUBDIVISION PLAT. The Planning Commission shall review the Final Subdivision
Plat and the report of the Staff, taking into consideration requirements of the Land
Management Code, the General Plan, and any Master Plan, site plan, or Sensitive Lands
Analysis approved or pending on the Property. Particular attention will be given to the
arrangement location and width of Streets and their relation to sewerage disposal,
drainage . erosion, topography and natural features of the Property, location of Physical
Mine Hazards and Geologic Hazards, Lot sizes and arrangement, the further
Development of adjoining lands as yet un-subdivided, requirements of the Preliminary
Plat (if a Preliminary Plat was required), and requirements of the Official Zoning Map
and Streets Master Plan, as adopted by the Planning Commission and City Council.
The Planning Commission shall make a finding as to Good Cause prior to making a
positive recommendation to City Council.
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( 1) The Planning Commission shall give notice pursuant to Section 15-1-12 of this
Code and hold a public hearing on the proposed final Subdivision Plat before making
its final recommendation to the City Council.
(2) After considering the final Subdivision Plat and proposed ordinance, the Planning
Commission shall recommend to the City Council approval or disapproval of the
Subdivision Application and set forth in detail any conditions to which the approval is
subject, or the reasons for disapproval.

tv

(3) The City Council may adopt or reject the ordinance either as proposed by the
Planning Commission or by making any revision it considers appropriate.
(4) In the final ordinance the City Council shall stipulate the period of time when the
Final Plat shall be recorded and when the performance Guarantee shall be filed or the
required improvements installed, whichever is applicable. Provided, however, that no
plats will be approved or released for recording until necessary Guarantees have been
established in accordance with the Land Management Code. In no event shall the
period of time stipulated by the City Council for completion of required
improvements exceed two (2) years from the date of the final ordinance.
(5) Extension of Approval. Applicants may request time extensions of the City
Council approval by submitting a request in writing to the Planning Department prior
to expiration of the approval. The City Council may grant an extension to the
expiration date when the Applicant is able to demonstrate no change in circumstance
that would result in an unmitigated impact or that would result in a finding of noncompliance with the Park City General Plan or the Land Management Code in effect
at the time of the extension request. Change in circumstance includes physical
changes to the Property or surroundings. Notice shall be provided consistent with the
requirements for a Final Plat in Section 15-1-12.
(D) SUBMISSION AND REVIEW. Subsequent to the resolution of the Planning
Commission, one (1) paper copy of the construction plans, and one copy of the original
Subdivision Plat on paper shall be submitted to the Planning Department for final review.
No final approval shall be endorsed on the plat until the staffs review has indicated that
all requirements of the ordinance have been met.
(E) VESTED RIGHTS. Vesting for purposes of zoning occurs upon the filing of a
complete Appiication provided, however, that no vested rights shall accrue to any plat by
reason of preliminary or final approval until the actual signing of the plat by the
Chairman of the Planning Commission and the Mayor of Park City. All requirements,
conditions, or regulations adopted by the Planning Commission and City Council
applicable to the Subdivision or to all Subdivisions generally shall be deemed a condition
for any Subdivision prior to the time of the signing of the Final Plat by the Chairman of
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~

~

the Planning Commission and Mayor. Where the Planning Commission or Council has
required the installation of improvements prior to signing of the Final Plat, the Planning
Commission or Council shall not unreasonably modify the conditions set forth in the final
approval.

***
PARK CITY LAND MGMT. CODE

S 15-15-1.57. COMPATIBLE OR COMPATIBILITY.

Characteristics of different Uses or designs that integrate with and relate to one another to
maintain and/or enhance the context of a surrounding Area or neighborhood. Elements
affecting Compatibility include, but are not limited to, Height, scale, mass and bulk of
Building, pedestrian and vehicular circulation, parking, landscaping and architecture,
topography, environmentally sensitive Areas, and Building patterns.
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ADDENDUMC
HOLIDAY RANCHETTES SUBDIVISION PLAT CONTAINING DORITY SPRINGS
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ADDENDUMD
HOLIDAY RANCHETTES

CC&Rs STANDARDS CONTAINING LOT 83

~
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